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Abstract 
This paper brings together thinking from the history of science, science and tech-
nology studies and social/cultural anthropology to better understand how human 
diversity is handled in everyday practices in science and beyond. Our aim is to take 
the social and historical contingency of practice as a starting point and to focus on 
the patterning of practice, which arises from the constraints of socio-material 
alignments and leads to the co-production of diversity. 
Under the headings of race and ethnicity, sorting practices with regards to human 
diversity have been at the centre of anthropological thinking and critique since the 
age of Enlightenment. Constructivist critique has insisted on understanding "race" 
as a social construct and warned of reifying differences of a socio-cultural making. 
This critique has so far not been particularly fruitful in dealing with human biologi-
cal difference as produced in different everyday practices in science and beyond. 
Recently, molecular genetics have reinvigorated the interest to stratify human 
populations into subpopulations to improve drug development and targeting, to 
ascertain vulnerabilities and plasticity, to adjust nutritional intake or therapeutic 
strategies or to trace ethnic ancestries. We suggest that the shortcomings of con-
structivist critique in the face of these latest developments are due to its focus on 
theoretical concepts and self-descriptions rather than the practices and their im-
plicit logics within and outside science proper. By employing Hacking's concepts of 
'making up people' and 'looping', Rabinow's 'biosociality', as well as Callon's con-
cept of 'translation', we hope to show the interactive dynamics of classification and 
response which take place at the interface between different knowledge practices. 
We trace translations through the life sciences into clinical practice and beyond 
into different social constellations, involving medical practice, made-up people and 
social bodies in order to show how human diversity is produced in practice. We put 
an emphasis on the different roles that biohistorical narratives, standardised pack-
ages and forms of resistance and appropriation play within these constellations. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Making a difference 
Practices of sorting and classification 
are an all-pervasive feature of everyday 
life not only in modern societies 
(Star/Bowker 2000). These practices 
create difference. In many cases, they 
are procedures structuring daily activi-
ties such as separating administrative 
papers from academic papers on our 
desks or distinguishing between op-
tions for lunch. Already at this seem-
ingly trivial level, "sorting things out" 
as a knowledge practice requires dif-
ferent actors, strategies and artefacts 
to relate to each other in order to 
make sense of particular constella-
tions. 
Where society or social order is con-
cerned, the effects of sorting practices 
have always been at the centre of so-
cial scientific investigation without the 
practices themselves necessarily re-
ceiving a great deal of attention. It is 
perhaps Luhmann's thinking on the 
nature and role of observation as nec-
essarily distinguishing between two 
kinds, which has been most centrally 
concerned with sorting practices 
themselves rather than just their ef-
fects (Luhmann 1992). 
The need to distinguish between kinds 
gains a particular relevance when it 
comes to biological differences be-
tween human beings. While state-of-
the-art biological knowledge portrays 
the human species as existing along a 
spectrum of continuous variation with-
in which reasonable categories cannot 
be justified1, everyday practice in the 
sciences as elsewhere necessarily 
makes distinctions also on the basis of 
biological markers. How this discrep-
ancy is handled, rather than its onto-
logical status, is the focus of this pa-
per. Classificatory practices are thus 
                                                       
1 See, for example, the publications of the 
Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary 
Anthropology (Grine et al. 2007) or the 
American Anthropological Association (AAA 
1998). 
understood as necessarily intertwining 
scientific-technical knowledges with 
political-moral discourses. 
Under the headings of race and ethnic-
ity, sorting practices with regards to 
human populations and diversity have 
been at the centre of anthropological 
thinking and critique since the age of 
Enlightenment. As scientific practices, 
they gained more importance in the 
late 19th century, at the peak of colo-
nialism, and with the rise of empiri-
cism in administration as well as the 
sciences (Hacking 1990). Throughout 
the 20th century, notions of human 
diversity have undergone fundamental 
changes, not only as responding to the 
terrible consequences of racist think-
ing, but also due to alterations of po-
litical as well as epistemic cultures. 
Although cultural anthropologists and 
social scientists particularly in North 
America had begun to critique biologi-
cal notions of race and ethnicity since 
the beginning of the 20th century, this 
critique became influential in political 
and scientific contexts in the second 
half of the 20th century. After World 
War II, with active participation of ge-
neticists and anthropologists in anti-
racist campaigns, a seemingly stable 
public consensus was reached about 
the biological insignificance and 
meaninglessness of racial differences 
(Reardon 2004). The idea that race is a 
social construct and thus an object of 
social rather than biological inquiry 
has been gradually developed towards 
a constructivist critique ever since. 
The scientific "puzzle" of human diver-
sity, however, has not disappeared. 
Physical anthropologists around the 
world did not abandon concepts of 
race but carried on employing racial 
categories in working routines and 
academic textbooks. Towards the end 
of the 20th century, population genet-
ics shifted notions of human diversity 
from race to population. Public proc-
lamations of the biological meaning-
lessness of race accompanied the en-
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deavours to decipher the human ge-
nome in the late 1990s.2 
Yet only a few years later, the problem 
of "found"3 biological difference re-
emerged and with it the question how 
to interpret and attach meaning to it as 
well as its usefulness in biomedical 
research and therapy (Reardon 2004). 
The Human Genome Project and the 
subsequent "-omics" initiatives to de-
cipher different levels of complexity all 
the way to the epigenome (Murrell et 
al. 2005) have reinvigorated the inter-
est of the life sciences to stratify hu-
man populations into subpopulations 
for a whole range of reasons: to im-
prove drug development and targeting 
(Anderson et al. 2003, Evans/McLeod 
2003, Evans/Relling 1999, Watters/ 
McLeod 2003), to ascertain vulnerabili-
ties and plasticity (Hsu et al. 1996), to 
adjust nutritional intake (Afman/Muller 
2006) or therapeutic strategies (Lin et 
al. 2006, Pi/Simpson 2005) or to trace 
the ethnic ancestry of individuals. 
While the vision of personalised medi-
cine still faces fundamental obstacles 
on its way to market fruition (Kollek et 
al. 2003, Lee 2003), biomedical sorting 
of human populations finds broad 
support in research and industry and is 
common practice today. 
This calls for attention on part of the 
humanities and social sciences. Yet 
particularly in Germany, the response 
has been virtually non-existent. While 
scholars in the humanities approach 
human diversity studies – and that 
means, mainly publications of biolo-
gists – from the perspective of dis-
course analysis, social science investi-
gations of current biological or medi-
                                                       
2 The "population paradigm" seems to allow 
for a much more differentiated, and hence 
more sophisticated, representation of hu-
man diversity, but it differs significantly 
from the constructivist idea that human 
diversity is nothing but a social construct. 
3 "Found", as a play of words, is here meant 
to point to the problematic relationship 
between data and knowledge as well as 
representation and fabrication of scientific 
facts. 
cal practice and its effects outside sci-
ence proper with respect to human 
diversity are rare. Internationally, par-
ticularly in North America, the re-
sponse has been different if not neces-
sarily all that more fruitful. In the US 
and in Canada, anthropology4 enjoys a 
much more prominent position within 
the scientific debate and has insisted 
on understanding "race" as a social 
construct, warned of reifying differ-
ences of a socio-cultural making and 
continuously critiqued any sign of re-
naturalisation and essentialising 
(Cooper et al. 2003, Duster 2006, Ep-
stein 2004, Goodman 1995, Holden 
2003). Nevertheless, beliefs in race as a 
biologically clearly identifiable differ-
ence remain prominent not only in 
parts of the scientific community but 
also in public and media discourse. 
Further, in politics and administration, 
race as a non-biological concept is still 
used in prominent processes such as 
the US Census.5 It is thus by no means 
clear what effect the constructivist 
critique of cultural anthropologists is 
producing. The American Anthropo-
logical Association (AAA), however, is 
set on continuing their line of critique 
and has now begun to think preven-
tively by starting to produce educa-
tional packages designed to deliver the 
constructivist message to schools.6 
                                                       
4 Translations between German and English 
often lead to terminological confusion: In 
Anglo-American contexts, "anthropology" 
means "cultural anthropology", if no attrib-
ute is added (such as "physical anthropol-
ogy", which is a discipline in its own right). 
Especially in Germany, "anthropology" 
stands for "physical anthropology", if no 
further attribute – such as "historical" or 
"social" – is added. Furthermore, the terms 
"race" and "Rasse" are no equivalents ei-
ther. While "Rasse" stands for biological 
aspects of diversity only, "race" represents 
more than biological notions, however it 
might be reduced to its biological meaning 
in certain situations. 
5 See www.census.gov 
6 For further information see the American 
Anthropology Association website, with 
links to various scientific statements, edu-
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The response of the bioscience com-
munity to this critique needs to be 
examined carefully. Since the debates 
around the Human Genome Diversity 
Project, public and scientific resistance 
to research that operates with race as 
an implicitly biological concept is be-
ing taken seriously. A number of edito-
rials appeared in prominent places to 
clarify that race has no biological ba-
sis, that intra-group variation by far 
exceeds inter-group variation in all 
meaningful studies, that it is a social 
construct (Holden 2003, Kittles/Weiss 
2003, Lee 2003, Whaley 2003). Yet, 
while accepting race as a social con-
struct, biological differences within 
human populations nevertheless re-
main important.7 Many recent contro-
versies have illustrated that the deci-
sion whether these biological differ-
ences are accepted as a viable means 
of differentiation depends on a whole 
host of factors in- and outside of sci-
ence proper, only some of which are 
being problematised to a certain extent 
within the biomedical community it-
self.8 In the spectacular cases, such as 
the US FDA approval of the heart fail-
ure drug BiDil for African-Americans 
(Kahn 2006) or the stalling of the Hu-
man Genome Diversity Project (Cavalli-
Sforza 2005), the reasons lay in regula-
tory policy, economics, political and 
moral resistance as much as in the 
science itself (M'Charek 2005). 
In the laboratories, however, away 
from the relative glare of public social 
and ethical scrutiny, race continues to 
be used for rather pragmatic reasons 
of data availability, comparability and 
                                                                  
cation projects and material: www.aaanet. 
org and http://raceproject.aaanet.org. 
7 This is not to say that the changes, which 
have occurred have been merely rhetorical; 
though a perceptible increase of the use of 
a biologically based notion of ethnicity in 
scientific publications has occurred (Kap-
lan & Bennett 2003; Zhu et al 2005). 
8 See the 2004 supplement of the journal 
Nature Genetics, titled "Genetics for the 
Human Race", that discusses the problem-
atic aspects of this phenomenon 2004 
(2004). 
marketing chances. This difference 
between politically correct, purified 
self-description and everyday practice 
is significant. Althusser and Bachelard 
have pointed out the need to distin-
guish between the natural scientists' 
spontaneous philosophy and the op-
erative epistemologies of scientific 
practices (Althusser 1990). Yet current 
social constructivist critique struggles 
to deal with this differentiation be-
cause it attaches to the theoretical 
concepts and self-descriptions rather 
than the practices and their implicit 
logics. 
Further, we suggest that social science 
research has systematically failed to 
take into account materiality. From the 
turn of the last century, scholars such 
as Durkheim, Weber and Simmel and, 
later, Kuhn, Adorno and Habermas 
have insisted on a domain of the social 
resolutely purified from materialist 
encroachment; all, of course, for very 
good reasons of resistance against an 
increasing "confused positivism" 
(Whitehead 1968: 179 German version, 
transl. by authors). In Germany, a new 
sociology of technology, which 
emerged in the 1980s, (re)introduced 
materiality by analysing its complex 
integration and multiple role within 
networks of agency (focusing particu-
larly but not only on technological 
artefacts) (Joerges 1987, 1988). In a 
similar vein, studies on the social con-
struction of technology emerged 
around the same time, portraying ma-
teriality as enacted or at least condi-
tioned by social practice (Bijker et al. 
1987). This paved the way for an his-
torically informed science and tech-
nology studies and actor-network-
theory, which further differentiated the 
role of materiality as technology in 
social analyses of scientific practice 
(Biagioli 1999, Knorr-Cetina 1999, La-
tour/Woolgar 1986, Pickering 1995). 
Yet materiality as body, as physiology 
and as biology has remained largely 
outside of social scientific analyses, 
with very few exceptions in performa-
tive approaches which focus on em-
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bodiment as body enacted through 
technological practice, but do not 
cross the border to integrate physiol-
ogy (Akrich/Pasveer 2004, Berg/Akrich 
2004, Epstein 2004, Gomart 2004, La-
tour 2004, Lock 2004, 2005, Mol/Law 
2004, Van Der Ploeg 2004). Still firmly 
entrenched in a constructivist dialectic, 
much of cultural anthropology is not 
even prepared to talk about biological 
difference for fear of being accused of 
reifying social difference. 
1.2 Beyond constructivism 
How to move beyond constructivist 
critique has thus become a prominent 
challenge in the social sciences. The 
annual meeting of German sociology 
2006 seemed to offer a somewhat real-
ist position, which begins to take ma-
teriality as revealed by the biosciences 
as fact. As a consequence, sociology – 
at least according to the emerging 
consensus of its practitioners – ought 
to focus on the non-material aspects 
left to socio-cultural shaping. We take 
this position to be too defensive. 
Taking up some of the strands from 
the more courageous debate in the 
2006 STI special issue (Schulz-
Schaeffer et al. 2006), we use the ex-
ample of human biological difference 
to demonstrate a different way of han-
dling the modern dichotomy between 
nature and culture by bringing to-
gether thinking from the history of 
science, science and technology stud-
ies and social/cultural anthropology. 
This paper, then, is meant to demon-
strate the need for a heightened sensi-
tivity towards certain theoretical 
strands when working in and on 
knowledge practices concerned inter 
alia with different forms of materiality. 
While it leans to a degree on concepts 
from a social anthropology of knowl-
edge, actor-network-theory and a his-
torically sensitised science and tech-
nology studies (STS) as well as phi-
losophy of science, its primary goal is 
not the positioning in one or another 
theoretical framework. Rather, we un-
derstand theory in the sense of 
Deleuze and Foucault as a tool, which 
is necessary to understand the logics 
of modern constellations (Deleuze 
1997). 
Our "field", human diversity in every-
day scientific practice, at a first glance 
seems to be primarily one of scientific 
actors, hence suggests an investigation 
using an STS vocabulary. Yet what we 
are hoping to show is the multiple 
embeddedness of scientific practice in 
social and political contexts. While 
concepts such as epistemic culture 
(Knorr-Cetina 1999) have been devel-
oped from work on scientific contexts, 
the multiple interactions, resistances 
and co-productions between scientific 
practices and social contexts have re-
ceived less attention outside a rather 
narrow social psychological or public 
understanding of science perspective 
(Stifterverband 2000) and its critique 
(Irwin 1999, Irwin 2001, Wynne 1996, 
1999). In spite of many more or less 
successful attempts to abandon the 
division line between science and the 
public (Goschler 2000), historians of 
science have rarely traced the easy 
travelling of knowledge practices be-
tween those spheres (Hess 2000). 
Similarly, social science work rarely 
focuses explicitly on the multiple in-
teractions between scientific practice 
and a wider social context.9 
We thus take as our starting point Ian 
Hacking in order to focus on the inter-
faces between scientific and everyday 
practice: 
"I coined two slogans. The first one, 'Mak-
ing up people' referred to the ways in 
which a new scientific classification may 
bring into being a new kind of person, 
conceived of and experienced as a way to 
be a person. The second, the 'looping ef-
fect', referred to the way in which a classifi-
                                                       
9 A notable exception in sociology is cer-
tainly Ted Benton's 1991 programmatic 
paper on biology and social science 
(Benton 1991), while Peter Baldwin's "Con-
tagion and the State in Europe" opens up 
another line of thinking on the link be-
tween scientific expertise and political 
ideology (Baldwin 1999). 
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cation may interact with the people classi-
fied." (Hacking 2006: 1) 
The interactive dynamics of classifica-
tion and response take place at the 
interface between different knowledge 
practices, hence they demand not only 
a different theoretical repertoire but 
also a wider approach to empirical 
work. While this paper does not focus 
on the inherently political nature of 
classificatory practices, it is important 
to note that making up people and 
looping, particularly in contexts of ill-
ness/disease, are intimately tied to 
transformations and thus technologies 
of the self, which are themselves – as 
patterns of practice – part of wider 
biopolitical assemblages in motion 
(Rabinow/Rose 2006, Rose 1998, 
2001)10. 
As a philosopher and historian of sci-
ence, the material on which Hacking 
draws has a tendency to lead to a 
rather linear thinking of classification 
processes. Though his "engines of dis-
covery" escape the narrow focus of a 
history of ideas, they nevertheless lack 
the attention to knowledge practices in 
the public domain and outside of sci-
ence proper. Callon's concept of trans-
lation appears to be more useful in this 
context (Callon 1999). We take transla-
tion to refer to a dynamic knowledge 
practice aimed at creating an alliance 
or network, which in this shape or 
form did not exist before. Translation 
emphasises the transient nature of 
alliances, the spatial-temporal pattern-
ing of interactions as well as the am-
bivalent dynamics of such constella-
tions of actants. Translation allows for 
symmetry of material and human 
agency11 and operates via interesse-
                                                       
10 We thank the reviewers for emphasising 
the intimate link between Hacking's argu-
ment and the line of work on governmen-
tality and related concepts. While we will 
certainly take this into account throughout 
the course of the forthcoming work, we 
apologise for having to leave the political 
nature of classification rather more sketchy 
than it deserves in this context. 
11 The concept of material agency (see be-
low) does not imply an analogue under-
ment to position and engage actants. 
Central to these mechanisms is the 
notion of something fact-like, which is 
able to travel across contexts. This 
fact-like entity has been referred to as 
standardised package (Fujimura 1992), 
faitiche (Latour 2002) or boundary 
object (Star/Griesemer 1989) with dif-
ferent connotations. 
The following section will trace trans-
lations through the bio- and life sci-
ences into clinical practice and beyond 
into different social constellations in 
order to show how human diversity is 
produced in practice.12 Giving the 
breadth of the topic and the focus on 
the epistemology of social scientific 
investigation, this paper is necessarily 
only able to produce a cursory impres-
sion, which must neglect details many 
readers will perceive as important. 
 
2 Practicing Diversity 
2.1 Biohistorical narratives 
The following sections use observa-
tions on the production of knowledge 
surrounding human diversity to illus-
trate how classificatory practices pro-
duce difference. To avoid an overly 
complicated picture, we focus on the 
knowledge production in regard to one 
specific "branch" of the homo sapiens 
pedigree, namely, the Europeans. This 
branch, however vague its extensions 
were imagined, was termed "the Euro-
pean race" in the beginning of the 20th 
century, "Caucasian" or "White" in an-
glo-American contexts and "Europids" 
                                                                  
standing of agency as we know it from 
social science. 
12 Much of the methods and the empirical 
material discussed here comes from three 
interdisciplinary research projects all coor-
dinated at Humboldt University, Berlin: 
C:SL Collaboratory – "Social and Cultural 
Anthropology of the Life Sciences" 
(www.csal.de); collaboratory project "Imag-
ined Europeans. The scientific construction 
of the Homo Europaeus" (www.imagined-
europeans.org); research cluster "Preven-
tive Self: an interdisciplinary investigation 
of an emergent form of life", www.csal.de) 
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– in contrast to "Mongolids" and 
"Negrids" – in Europe, particulary in 
both Germanies, up to the 1990s. 
The first scientific attempt to classify 
different human kinds was undertaken 
by Carl Linné, who separated the homo 
sapiens europaeus from three other 
'races' already in the 18th century. 
Shortly after, Johann F. Blumenbach 
coined the term Caucasian for white 
people who according to his thinking 
were the ancestors of the human spe-
cies and had emerged from the Cauca-
sus (Baum 2006, Jacobson 1998). 
In the late 19th century, the classifica-
tion of human beings increasingly re-
quired much more than mere theoreti-
cal speculation. It became, first of all, 
an empirical enterprise. Skulls and 
bones were excavated and measured; 
bodies of living humans were scruti-
nized and the results carefully reported 
in complex inscription regimes. As 
soon as serological methods 
were available for large-scale 
investigations, blood samples 
were taken and analyzed in 
laboratories in order to find 
racial differences. Anatomists 
searched for racial diversifica-
tions of brains and skeletons. 
Methods and findings of such 
research endeavours in the 
materiality of human diversity 
might not seem very convinc-
ing to today's reader, but they 
enjoyed the prestige of objec-
tive and empirically proven 
scientific practices at the time. 
The European was not the pri-
mary object of anthropological 
interest. Anthropologists 
throughout the 19th and the 
greatest part of the 20th century 
simply took for granted that 
Europeans existed as a clearly 
demarcated biological group. 
Rather than making the homo 
europaeus an object of their 
research, anthropologists used 
him as a point of reference and 
control in the investigations of 
non-Europeans. Especially dur-
ing research endeavours to the colo-
nies, anthropologists and medical 
practitioners were engaged in distin-
guishing and comparing human 
groups according to their physical con-
stitution. The primary sorting mecha-
nism relied on the difference between 
European and non-European.13 
In contrast, investigations within 
Europe focussed on sub groups of the 
Europeans, such as "national" or "re-
gional races". During the first half of 
the 20th century, attention shifted to-
wards subdivisions of Europeans 
themselves. Not contradicting this fo-
cus on subdivision, it often went with-
out saying that the sub group under 
scrutiny was at the same time consid-
ered European. Against the backdrop 
                                                       
13 This is obvious from the research design 
of studies such as Bruck 1907, Fischer 
1913. 
Figure 1:  Pedigree of Homo Sapiens 
source: Linder/Bayrhuber 1991: 428 
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of a common European ancestry, an-
thropologists also began to focus on 
distinctions between Northern, Eastern 
and Southern Europeans, between and 
even beyond nation states. 
More detailed differentiations hence 
did not contradict or break up the 
classification of mankind into several 
major races, such as Europids, Mon-
golids and Negrids. From the early 
beginnings of human diversity studies 
all classificatory schemata were based 
on three or five races. Although, for 
example, the vision of an "Aryan race" 
began to dominate the first half of the 
20th century in Germany, simultane-
ously the classification into three 
groups introduced by anthropologist 
Egon Freiherr von Eickstedt in the 
early 1930s was retained as reliable 
scientific knowledge (Eickstedt 1934). 
After World War II, in both German 
states, as in the UK, the USA and the 
former Soviet Union, and in spite of 
anti-racist acitivities, a classification of 
humans into three or five races gained 
wide acceptance and was retained in 
encyclopaedias as well as teaching 
materials until the 1990s (Reardon 
2004, Feustel 1990, Knußmann 1996, 
Nesturch 1959, Straaß 1978). 
Since the 1980s, population geneticists 
have continued to point out that the 
genetic diversity of the human species 
does not permit such coarse classifica-
tions. Rather, the species can only be 
separated into manifold subgroups – 
populations – separated by continuous 
transitions instead of sharp breaks. 
Molecular genetics seems to have is-
sued the final word on the race ques-
tion. The "population paradigm", as 
one might term it, has allowed for im-
pressive public and political proclama-
tions about the biological meaning-
lessness of race.14 
Yet at the same time, racial classifica-
tions remain central to biomedical 
research as well as clinical practice. 
                                                       
14 See for example the UNESCO statements 
on race (Reardon 2004). 
Race has been (re)invented as a mean-
ingful category in medical genetics 
research in the last ten years or so. 
And while human geneticists proclaim 
that the inter-individual variance of 
human genomes is not significant, the 
work in human genetics laboratories 
concentrates on genetic differences 
between populations – be it European, 
Japanese, Danish, or Afro-American. 
This discrepancy not only demon-
strates Althusser and Bachelard's ar-
gument, it also marks the gap which 
makes constructivist critique difficult. 
In order to explain this discrepancy, it 
is important to take a closer look at 
the historical presumptions as well as 
current narratives inscribed into DNA 
sequences from the perspective of evo-
lutionary biology. Each DNA sequence 
with its particular piece of genetic in-
formation is wrapped within a certain 
biological story: several variants exist 
of each sequence. To explain how this 
variety has come about, biologists tell 
evolution stories which require only a 
few concepts such as mutation, selec-
tion and drift. In laboratories, these 
stories are continuously produced and 
reproduced, diversified and finally told 
as the stories of larger groups or races. 
We term these biological stories told 
by bioscientists "biohistorical narra-
tives". 
Plants and animals do not pay much 
attention to the stories biologists tell 
about their ancestry, and they do not 
leave behind historical records and 
documents. In the case of human di-
versity, however, these stories describe 
historical events using biological terms 
and might therefore generate conflict-
ing narratives on human history. 
Biohistorical narratives are not con-
fined to the domain of science – quite 
the contrary: They constitute integral 
elements of the identity building of 
many nations, families, ethnic groups 
or other social entities. However, since 
genetics and evolutionary biology have 
become the predominant source of 
knowledge on diversity and heredity, 
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most of those rather mystic narratives 
need to be aligned with modern genet-
ics in order to be consistent with con-
temporary understanding of "how life 
works". To explain, for example, why 
children resemble their parents, fami-
lies draw on their understanding of 
modern genetics. To explain how the 
early ancestors of modern Europeans 
became European, geneticists tell sto-
ries about historical events that 
shaped what today we know as ethnic 
diversity or human populations. 
The concept of biohistorical narratives 
is meant here to illustrate on the one 
hand how cultural-historical presump-
tions enter lab science. On the other 
hand, it demonstrates how scientific 
facts emerging from labs influence the 
discursively mediated conceptions of 
nature and history and how they can 
have an impact on the production of 
biological difference. They act as de-
vices of interessement in the sense that 
they form translations between DNA 
sequences and biological methods, 
presumptions about history, institu-
tional settings as well as mediated 
public discourse (Callon 1999). Thus 
biohistorical narratives go significantly 
beyond metaphors and also beyond a 
Foucaultian concept of discourse in 
that they are conceptualised relation-
ally and embedded in practice in as far 
as this is possible in historical re-
search.15 The following sections focus 
on the particular narrative of "the 
European" and how it is translated into 
biomedical and social practice. Given 
the complexity and breadth of the is-
sue, our account is necessarily sketchy 
pointing out in an exemplary manner 
the kinds of issues relevant in an in-
                                                       
15 Of course, many would argue that me-
taphors, or language in general, as well as 
discourse, particularly of a Foucaultian 
provenience, already incorporate relationa-
lity and materiality. However, the main-
stream in linguistics and post-structural 
social theory appears to take a rather more 
textual or symbolic perspective on the no-
tion of the narrative. 
vestigation of classificatory processes 
as practice. 
2.2 Homo Europaeus: hunter and 
gatherer 
Biohistorical narratives denote stories 
about nature, narratives about inheri-
tance, generation and evolution, which 
have become indispensable for the 
empirical life sciences, but are not 
being reflected as cultural presumption 
that are epistemologically contingent. 
The biological narrative about the 
European is a prominent example. 
Bioscientists report how Europeans 
have come to be what they are today; 
that today's Europeans decent from 
seven European molecular Eves (Sykes 
2001) and, furthermore, not from 
peasant immigrants from the Middle 
East, but from native hunters and 
gatherers (Haak 2005); why they pos-
sess particular enzymes which predis-
pose them to a particular health, a 
specific metabolism as well as certain 
nutritional needs, and how the latter 
co-evolved with agriculture and the 
domestication of plants and animals 
(Bloom/Paul 2005, Enattah 2002).16 
None of these research concepts expli-
cates which criteria have been re-
cruited to select the "European". In 
most cases, it seems that the white 
skin colour would have been the fore-
most criterion. Accordingly, there are 
narratives about how, when and why 
European skin turned white: that is, 
under which circumstances it has been 
a selective advantage to possess a ge-
netic make-up which did not favour 
the storage of dark pigments (Jab-
lonski 2000). For each gene, which 
appears to separate the European from 
the non-European, such an evolution-
ary narrative is available.17 
                                                       
16 For the latest findings on lactose intoler-
ance and the surrounding discussions 
about uniqueness and Europeanness of 
mutations, see Burger et al. 2007. 
17 Though, as to be expected, the findings 
do not stack up to an uncontroversial body 
of research. See e.g. Spielman et al. 2007 
for some of the latest findings. 
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These narratives, however, do not re-
main confined to the rather narrow 
bounds of evolutionary biology. As 
empirically determined (and to a large 
degree naturalised) genetic differences, 
they translate into clinical practice 
where they are being used to differen-
tially treat people, for example, in 
health services. Ethnicity is commonly 
seen and used as a phenotypic short-
cut to the genetic make-up. BiDil ex-
emplifies the pharma industry's inter-
est in these developments (Kahn 2006). 
Questions about the "nature" of ethnic 
differences have thus again acquired 
significance posing fundamental new 
challenges for health systems with 
regard to observational practices, di-
agnosis and administration of treat-
ment. 
The concept of the biohistorical narra-
tive exposes part of the translational 
work which goes into the production 
of naturalised accounts of human dif-
ference. Yet narratives alone would 
probably not suffice to bolster the 
plausibility of these accounts. To a 
significant extent, it is the routinisa-
tion of particular lines of thought in 
technical procedure and its locking in 
biological material cum technology 
which supports the reification of Euro-
peanness in biological practice. 
This process is exemplified by the ge-
nealogy and current use of the so-
called Anderson sequence, i.e. the 
standard DNA sequence to measure 
genetic difference from the European. 
M'Charek reveals in a detailed labora-
tory study how the Anderson sequence 
is reified in work routines and treated 
as a neutral piece of technology repre-
senting standard European DNA 
(M'Charek 2005). She reports that 
leading geneticists admit that there is 
a racial bias in this neutral piece of lab 
technology: Instead of a European 
sequence, one might have chosen an 
African or Asian or Neanderthalian 
sequence as well, but since the first 
analysed sequence happened to be a 
European, it was just convenient to 
take this as a standard reference. A 
closer look reveals that the Anderson 
sequence not only stems from different 
women but that at least one of them 
has been African-American. It is par-
ticularly due to these standardisation 
procedures that ethnocentric diagnosis 
or treatment regimes are often highly 
problematic. 
Having lost this particular context, 
however, the Anderson sequence as a 
scientific tool enables the production 
of genealogical trees of the human 
species that are able to ignore the his-
toricity of the sequence while giving an 
accurate historical insight into the 
development of the human species. 
Within evolutionary biology the Ander-
son sequence serves as a standardised 
package– an element of a material-
discursive alignment which has be-
come central to the study of human 
ancestry so as to largely escape further 
disciplinary reflection and questioning 
(Fujimura 1992). Furthermore, human 
diversity – or, more precisely, genetic 
differences between ethnic groups – is 
more than just an epistemic object in 
this context (Rheinberger 1997): it also 
gains the status of a technical object, 
or tool, that helps to investigate other 
objects of interest, such as disease 
distribution and ancestry, or to distin-
guish between 'criminal' and 'innocent 
citizen'. 
2.3 Making up people 
For single disciplines, such as evolu-
tionary biology, the different aspects of 
the concept of the standardised pack-
age have been widely discussed in 
their many facets. Across disciplines, 
the theoretical repertoire narrows 
somewhat. While the concept of the 
epistemic object (Rheinberger 1997) 
and the immutable mobile (Latour 
1995) are able to focus on the modes 
of production of distinct and stable 
alignments of knowledge, technology 
and materiality as well as their ability 
to travel and reappear in different con-
texts, less has been said about their 
reception and the effect they may have 
Lipphardt/Niewöhner: Producing difference 55 
 
on contexts within which they are re-
produced. 
The following section, therefore, 
briefly illustrates how medical research 
on obesity and cardio-vascular risk 
translates evolutionary biology into its 
own knowledge practices to streng-
then particular hypotheses and aetio-
logical models: 
Overweight continues to trouble public 
health experts and molecular biolo-
gists alike (WHO 1998). Many aetio-
logical models have been discussed 
without any of them fully able to ex-
plain the current increase or the distri-
bution of weight across populations 
(Faith et al. 2002, Farooqi 2006, Ros-
mond 2005, Vitaliano et al. 2002). 
Since the mid-1980s, overweight is 
being discussed in the wider context of 
the metabolic syndrome: a statistical 
co-occurrence of metabolic and 
physiological parameters, i.e. weight, 
serum lipids, cholesterol, blood pres-
sure and fasting glucose predisposing 
the afflicted to an increased risk of 
atherosclerosis, diabetes mellitus type 
II and cardiovascular disease (Kahn et 
al. 2005, Khunti/Davies 2005, Reaven 
1988). The existence, definition, utility 
and diagnosis of the syndrome are 
being fiercely debated.18 The genetics 
of the syndrome has become increas-
ingly important over the last five to ten 
years in line with a general expansion 
of research efforts at the level of genes 
and the genome (Hughes/Aitman 2004, 
Illig et al. 2005, Roche et al. 2005, 
Shmulewitz et al. 2006).19 
                                                       
18 The controversy is currently being in-
vestigated from a science studies and e-
thics perspective (Chatterton October 
2006). See also Niewöhner 2007. 
19 Particularly the implication of insulin 
resistance in the syndrome's aetiology 
supported a molecularisation of the re-
search landscape as the metabolic syn-
drome became attractive to the diabetes 
research community, which already had a 
significant interest and research capacity in 
the genetics of insulin action (Ahima et al. 
2006, Bjorntorp 1995, Gil-Campos et al. 
2004, Hughes/Aitman 2004). Furthermore, 
Intricately linked to this rise of genom-
ics research are questions about the 
transmission of disease relevant fac-
tors between generations and, conse-
quently, questions about the evolu-
tionary basis for current diseases and 
their distribution. This is where the 
biohistorical narrative about the Euro-
pean hunter gatherer enters the frame. 
While the so-called "thrifty gene" hy-
pothesis had been developed already 
in 1962 as a general concept (Armitage 
et al. 2004, Neel 1962), it re-emerged 
during the 1990s as a more specific 
explanatory model to understand the 
differential increase and distribution of 
weight across the globe. According to 
this hypothesis, the early Europeans 
were striving through Europe hunting 
and gathering. Those with a high fat 
storage capacity had a selective advan-
tage in an environment of variable 
nutritional supply. Hence genomes 
were selected for in the human popu-
lation that favoured rapid fat storage. 
With the change to a modern, Western 
lifestyle, marked by a continuous nu-
tritional supply and little effort in the 
acquisition of food, the thrifty geno-
type has now turned from a selective 
advantage to a maladaptation predis-
posing the carrier to a higher risk 
status. Those of us that put on weight 
easily are presumed to possess this 
thrifty genotype. This hypothesis has 
been further developed to include a 
thrifty phenotype (Hales/Barker 1992) 
determined by imprinting processes 
through behavioural and environ-
mental influences within and across 
several generations (Griesemer 2002, 
Jablonka/Lamb 2002, Vijver et al. 
2002). 
The concept of the hunter gatherer 
shifts from evolutionary biology into 
biomedical research and epidemiology 
                                                                  
advances in the understanding of adipose 
tissue as hormonally active (Hutley/Prins 
2005, Rosmond/Bjorntorp 2001) have been 
influential as has an increasingly systemic 
understanding of the involvement of pe-
ripheral and central nervous activity 
(Bjorntorp 1999, Richard et al. 2002). 
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and is confronted with a totally differ-
ent set of assumptions. Whereas the 
Anderson sequence, concepts of drift, 
mutational clocks and selection made 
up the context for the hunter gatherer 
in the evolutionary biology labs, the 
translated European hunter has be-
come a fact, a naturalisation and reifi-
cation of history in biomedical re-
search, which is able to increase the 
plausibility of certain arguments about 
the interactions between genetic pre-
dispositions and lifestyle in modern 
societies. If the hunter gatherer narra-
tive were not available, it would be 
more difficult to argue the case: settled 
peasants who moved into Europe, for 
example, would have had less difficul-
ties in maintaining a constant food 
supply. Thus a thrifty gene would not 
be such a selective advantage. It often 
seems to be the intuitive plausibility of 
many evolutionary accounts as well as 
its ability to act as a boundary object 
(Star/Griesemer 1989) supporting 
translation processes across diverse 
research practices, which makes these 
broad sweeping hypotheses so im-
mensely powerful in scientific as well 
as public discourse. 
This brief illustration emphasises how 
the context within which the concept 
hunter gatherer has been initially pro-
duced is not simply lost. Rather, it re-
mains a somewhat abstract and im-
plicit source of legitimacy, which is 
able to resonate with different re-
search practices.20 They meander be-
tween a mere metaphoric use and an 
ability to organise a way of seeing the 
research field, generating hypotheses 
                                                       
20 John Law has pointed out that the crea-
tion of presence necessarily creates ab-
sence or othering as well (Law 2006). Here, 
the presence of the hunter gatherer as 
factual knowledge others the uncertainty 
attached to the concept in evolutionary 
biology. In a more systems theoretical 
language, one might consider different 
research practices as operationally closed 
systems, which develop something akin to 
structural coupling (Luhmann 1983) in 
order to handle increasing external 
complexity and create legitimacy. 
and influencing study design. While 
they help to legitimise a particular dy-
namic in biomedical research, it is 
crucial to note that this new context is 
not able to break up the routinisation 
of the concept and reflect the implicit 
assumptions inherent within it. 
Rheinberger lucidly analysed how epis-
temic objects oscillate between routine 
use and epistemological questioning 
(Rheinberger 1997). This works within 
disciplines because the context within 
which the object operates is intact and 
the assumptions can usually be made 
explicit. Once the object has been 
standardised, packaged and translated 
into a different disciplinary context, 
the possibility to reflect the implicit 
assumptions is largely lost. Biomedical 
researchers are not sufficiently familiar 
with the methodological and theoreti-
cal development of evolutionary biol-
ogy so as to be able to return the stan-
dardised package from routinisation.21 
Rather than critiquing this form of 
evolutionary translation, then, we fol-
low the actant, i.e. we briefly turn our 
eye to the effect of the hunter gatherer 
on diagnostics. 
                                                       
21 A point in passing: Latour has written 
about the concept of the faitiche (Latour 
2002) to reveal that it is indeed the conven-
tional constructivist position which rein-
forces the naturalisation of scientific fact. 
The constructivist argues that it is him who 
reveals to the positivist that his fetish-like 
object is merely a social construction; that 
if only he stopped believing, he could see 
what lies behind the construction, namely 
a particular social constellation. Of course, 
by so doing, he is blind to the fact that the 
science community does not invest ontolo-
gical belief in its objects: they merely work 
in practice. Thus telling the scientist about 
the social constructedness of their objects 
makes little difference to most. Social 
scientific analyses thus need to accept the 
contingency (Rorty 1989) of scientific prac-
tices as a starting point from which to in-
vestigate the unresolvable entangling of 
representation, production and materiality 
as well as its consequences. 
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The International Diabetes Federation 
concerned with and about the current 
obesity epidemic is keen to improve 
early diagnosis of metabolic changes 
in order to intervene as preventively as 
possible with lifestyle changes and 
drug-based therapy. The current book-
let on their worldwide consensus defi-
nition of the metabolic syndrome (IDF 
2006) includes waist circumference as 
one of five diagnostic criteria. This in 
itself is highly controversial, as body 
mass index and waist to hip ratio are 
also being put forward as the more 
powerful indicators, but not unusual 
(NCEP 2001, WHO 1998, 1999). 
Unusual is the ethnic stratification of 
waist circumference shown in figure 2. 
These ethnically sensitive cut-off 
points are based on epidemiological 
data from various sources rather than 
biomarkers indicating a thrifty geno-
type. Yet the thrifty gene hypothesis 
strengthens the role of genetic predis-
positions in aetiological debates and, 
combined with the hunter gatherer 
narrative, suggests that genetically 
different subpopulations will display 
different rates of obesity and cardio-
vascular disease. It thus favours an 
ethnic stratification of diagnostic crite-
ria over a range of others that might be 
equally suitable and readily available, 
for example: socio-economic status. 
While statistical data can never make 
any claims about individuals but must 
Figure 2: Ethnic Stratification of Waist Circumference 
source: International Diabetes Federation: 
Diagnostic Criteria for Metabolic Syndrome 2006 
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necessarily remain at the aggregate 
level of populations, the translation of 
evolutionary biology into biomedical 
hypotheses and into global clinical 
guidelines acts as a classificatory de-
vice in the sense of Hacking's making 
up people. The production of an indi-
vidual cardiovascular risk profile 
through an anamnesis at the local 
general practitioner including a con-
versation, biometrics and standard lab 
test links the individual to a global 
disease distribution. It translates 
population risk into a personal fact if 
not danger with very real conse-
quences.22 
2.4 Biosocialities 
Hacking argues that made-up people 
understand their new identity as a way 
to be a person. He refers to this inter-
active dynamic as the looping process 
(Hacking 2006). Hacking argues that 
whereas classifications such as autism, 
multiple personality disorder and ho-
mosexuality could at different times 
serve as ways to be a person, obesity 
will remain a mere attribute of a per-
son rather than a determining charac-
teristic. 
We take a different view. Certainly, 
obesity in its non-clinical forms does 
not seem to interfere with everyday 
live as much as autism seems to do. 
There are no particular treatment re-
gimes disrupting day-to-day practices 
as with many other chronic diseases; 
obesity does not really interfere with a 
person's ability to partake in working 
life, and perceptions and experiences 
of the self need not be massively al-
tered to bring together body and self-
images with appearance and possible 
social roles. 
However, it seems to us too narrow a 
view to focus only on the medical-
scientific element of a classificatory 
process. Neither the classificatory 
process itself nor the responses are 
driven purely by changes in a scientific 
                                                       
22 On the discussion of risk and danger in 
diagnostics, see also (Aronowitz 1998). 
rationale. Instead, both are entangled 
in wider issues of changes in social, 
political and moral order. The dynamic 
interactions of classificatory processes 
usually occur within a series of wider 
shifts involving public perceptions, 
institutional responsibilities and moral 
attributions. 
From a social anthropological perspec-
tive, obesity as part of the metabolic 
syndrome has become not only a dif-
ferent diagnosis but the most impor-
tant risk factor for cardiovascular dis-
ease; a disease that kills an estimated 
one million people each year globally 
and already binds around 7% of an-
nual national health spending in the 
industrialised world. Primary preven-
tion and health promotion have been 
identified as the most important 
strategies to get control over the 'obe-
sity epidemic' (Apitz/Winter 2004, Wal-
ter 2004, Windler et al. 2004). Preven-
tion in individual terms essentially 
means a change to a more sustainable 
lifestyle including exercise and a mod-
erately caloric diet. Prevention in insti-
tutional terms means intervention. 
While this has become a global effort 
that reaches from a WHO charta via an 
EU white paper to national guidelines 
(WHO/EU 2006), the German health 
minister has indicated that the solu-
tion from her perspective will not lie 
with national sanctions such as a tax 
on fat, television or cars (Walter/Scriba 
2004), but with individually tailored 
local solutions administered via the 
health insurers.23 Coercion, this lesson 
has been learned, does not work well 
within a state the people of which per-
ceive themselves and their approach to 
governance as liberal. Yet, as a conse-
quence, the focus is firstly on a kind of 
prevention which seeks out those peo-
ple who traditionally do not respond to 
appeals to self-management ("auf-
suchende Prävention"). Secondly, this 
liberal regime of intervention firmly 
                                                       
23 Presentation at "Berliner Republik, Inno-
vationsDialoge" November 2006, Hotel 
Alexander Plaza, Berlin, Germany. 
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rests on a view of the individual as a 
homo oeconomicus (Kirchgässner 
1991), as a self-regulated subject try-
ing to optimise its own life by rational 
choice. 
The implication of this is not only an 
increasing pressure on individuals to 
conform to medical and economic 
rationalities. More importantly, in its 
rhetoric it also conveys a strong moral 
message: not losing weight and start-
ing to exercise despite better knowl-
edge is a wilful disregard of the com-
munity of solidarity that is our society. 
To economically and morally sanction 
this kind of deviance has become the 
explicit target of many who advocate 
setting approaches to prevention, for 
example, at the workplace: it can no 
longer be cool to ignore health promo-
tion efforts at work; instead, it needs 
to be a decision, which is sanctioned 
by the peers as an attack on their wal-
let and solidarity in itself. 
It is clear from these impressions that 
classification as overweight or at risk 
is not merely a medical process but 
increasingly strongly loaded with so-
cial and moral meaning. It is, then, 
easier to see how being overweight 
can quickly become a way to be a per-
son. Also, it is in this wider context of 
prevention that the hunter gatherer 
and its translations into ethnicity-
bound regimes of difference enter into 
social practice beyond individual prac-
titioner patient encounters. The US 
American National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) has started to offer fitness 
programmes to its members to coun-
teract the obesity problematic in its 
community. The association's presi-
dent announced in his opening speech 
for the annual congress in 2006: 
"…We've got a Freedom Fighters Fitness 
Challenge. Go to the workshops, check it 
out. It speaks to obesity, and it speaks to 
the fact that there is a higher percentage of 
obesity in our communities than there is in 
the majority community. And we know all 
of the bad things that go along with obe-
sity, like diabetes, and high blood pressure, 
and heart disease. And we know that we've 
got it, right." 24 
Though this appeal carefully avoids 
any reference to genetics, the state-
ment "we've got it" at least implies also 
a biological component. Other materi-
als by the NAACP make the appeal 
even clearer: 
"With genetic predispositions coupled with 
poor diet and little to no physical activity, 
these numbers will only increase."25 
Here, the hunter gatherer appears as 
the risk to a specific ethnic subpopula-
tion, which then needs to respond. And 
it does respond as a community with a 
genetic predisposition. The fact that 
ethnicity may not be a sensible marker, 
that by far not everyone 'in the com-
munity' is affected and that more likely 
than not a whole range of other factors 
are significantly implicated in produc-
ing increases in cardiovascular risk, 
are sidelined. The hunter gatherer, 
while running across a number of so-
cial ordering effects, is translated into 
community practice. 
A very different story is told by the 
manifold nationally and internationally 
organised associations to advance fat 
or size acceptance, such as the Na-
tional Association for Fat Acceptance 
or the International Size Acceptance 
Association (similar groups exist 
across the world). Here, the impetus is 
primarily on resistance to the moral 
connotations and the stigmatisation 
that increases around overweight – the 
kind of resistance Ian Hacking pre-
sumed would not happen because be-
ing fat is not a way to be a person. The 
science that links overweight to car-
diovascular disease is disputed on the 
grounds that it is parameters usually 
associated with overweight rather than 
overweight itself, which lead to cardio-
vascular disease. As a consequence, 
                                                       
24 Bruce S. Gordon addresses the 97th 
NAACP Convention, 2006. <www.naacp. 
org> last accessed 27th of April 2007. 
25 San Jose Chapter NAACP health watch 
<http://sanjosenaacp.blogspot.com> last 
accessed 27th of April 2007. 
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groups such as the above advocate a 
mobile lifestyle, which does not worry 
about weight. At the same time, many 
of them point to what they perceive to 
be work showing an increasing genetic 
basis for overweight and consequently 
argue that it is unhelpful to act against 
a biological reality. Here, the thrifty 
genotype translates not into a threat to 
a community but into an important 
driver in a complex politics of identity. 
These two examples give a small fla-
vour of the complex constellations that 
arise from translations involving medi-
cal practice, made-up people and so-
cial bodies. The concept of somatic 
individuality has already pointed to the 
increasing role of the body in produc-
ing selves (Novas/Rose 2000). It is, 
however, in the age of biosociality that 
medical, moral and political interven-
tion logics increasingly blend into each 
other while controlling populations 
and shaping their nature according to 
cultural presumptions (Rabinow 1992). 
Biopolitics finds an ally in the govern-
ance of the soma (Beck/Niewöhner 
2006). 
 
3 Looping 
In his original writings on looping, 
Hacking suggested more strongly than 
in the later lectures that a loop would 
imply an adjustment of the original 
classificatory categories (Hacking 
1999). This closing of the loop was 
difficult to imagine from a science and 
technology focused perspective. The 
scientific community is not set up to 
receive feedback from those it classi-
fies. The public understanding of sci-
ence and humanities approach illus-
trates that, in some circles, this is not 
even perceived to be desirable. Yet 
understanding classificatory practices 
as translations in the way we have 
tried to show in the previous sections 
offers a new way to think the loop. 
Rather than looking for clearly deline-
ated pathways from the classified back 
into science, it is via the entangling of 
the classificatory processes in political, 
moral and economic practices that 
science remains engaged with the 
classified. This entanglement can take 
on easily visible forms, such as re-
search priorities and funding, insur-
ance companies putting specific drugs 
on their positive lists or media report-
ing. 
Even more importantly though is the 
less visible shifting of translations that 
has to do with implicit understandings 
of statehood, individuality and social-
ity. These shifts render possible certain 
interventions and foreclose others. 
They make particular research avenues 
appear more likely and strengthen 
certain alliances while lessening oth-
ers. In a somewhat different context, 
Hacking argued that the "taken for 
granted may have a greater effect on 
our sense who we are, or what it is to 
be a human being, than amazing 
achievements on the margins of our 
existence" (Hacking 2006). We take this 
as an invitation to further empirical 
work on translations in the banality of 
everyday life. 
Seen from a historical perspective, 
looping effects have occurred since the 
end of the 19th century, when biologi-
cal disciplines began to gain a greater 
impact on social processes. Classifica-
tions of human diversity have been 
used ever since to intervene in the 
biological make-up of populations by 
setting up laws, marriage counselling 
services, regimes of health and racial 
hygiene. The outcome of new loops as 
described above are yet unclear; how-
ever, neither cardiovascular risks nor 
fatness nor human diversity will re-
main what they are considered to be 
today, and this might be due to loop-
ing effects similar to those we have 
discussed. 
 
4 Concluding discussion 
We hope to have shown how transla-
tions produce human diversity in late 
modern societies as well as the differ-
ent roles biohistorical narratives, stan-
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dardised packages and forms of resis-
tance and appropriation play within 
these. We have put a particular em-
phasis on the multiple entanglement of 
different knowledge practices across 
scientific disciplines as well as advo-
cacy groups and sociality. And we have 
taken the social and historical contin-
gency of practice as a starting point to 
move beyond constructivist relativism 
in order to take seriously the pattern-
ing of practice which arises from the 
constraints of socio-material align-
ments. 
In our argument, we have sidelined 
issues of power and politics to an im-
plicit role. While our historio-eth-
nographic approach would also sup-
port an analysis focused on the gov-
ernance of human diversity and the 
implications for self-regulation and 
intervention, this has not been our 
point and we believe that it does not 
invalidate the analysis we presented 
here. 
More importantly, however, it is not 
clear whether we have succeeded in a 
symmetrical analysis that (re)intro-
duces materiality into social analyses. 
As far as technological and biological 
artefacts are concerned, we have given 
non-intentional agency to scientists 
and pressure groups, standardised cell 
lines and ethnically sensitive diagnos-
tic criteria. This may count as fulfilling 
Latour's call for symmetry to some 
degree. 
We have also employed the concept of 
translation to problematise what we 
believe to be dynamic socio-material 
practices, namely the co-production of 
diversity through technology, biologi-
cal material, scientific practice all en-
tangled in a wider socio-cultural con-
text. We thus hope to contribute to a 
diffusion of modern dichotomies by 
focusing on a co-productive rather 
than a binary vocabulary. 
Yet, while we are able to support no-
tions of somatic individuality (Novas/ 
Rose 2000) and biosociality (Rabinow 
1992), we have failed to properly in-
corporate the 'body biological' into an 
historical and social scientific analysis. 
Further work is ongoing at Humboldt-
University and the Charité Medical 
School to bring physiological parame-
ters into contact with psychometric 
data and ethnographic reporting of 
everyday life. We are thus committed 
to take symmetry seriously and further 
investigate the multiple entanglement 
of the biological body, perceptions and 
experiences of the body as well as rep-
resentations of the body. 
Such an analysis can only succeed if it 
is embedded within a framework of 
research that is at the same time 
clearly focused on disciplinary per-
spectives and broad enough to inte-
grate findings into a wider historio-
ethnographic picture of social practice. 
This is, we believe, only possible in an 
interdisciplinary setting that operates 
beyond constructivism and with an 
ironic appreciation of contingency. 
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